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Abstract
We study simple fi scal rules for stabilizing the government debt level in response to 
asymmetric demand shocks in a country that belongs to a currency union. We compare 
debt stabilization through tax rate adjustments with debt stabilization through expenditure 
changes. While rapid and fl exible adjustment of public expenditure might seem institutionally 
or informationally infeasible, we discuss one concrete way in which this might be 
implemented: setting salaries of public employees, and social transfers, in an alternative unit 
of account, and delegating the valuation of this numeraire to an independent fi scal authority. 
Using a sticky-price DSGE matching model of a small open economy in a currency 
union, we compare the business cycle implications of several different fi scal rules that all 
achieve the same reduction in the standard deviation of the public debt. In our simulations, 
compared with rules that adjust tax rates, a rule that stabilizes the budget by adjusting 
public salaries and transfers reduces fl uctuations in consumption, employment, and private 
and public after-tax real wages, thus bringing the market economy closer to the social 
planner’s solution.
Keywords: Fiscal authority, public wages, sovereign debt, monetary union.
JEL classifi cation: E24, E32, E62, F41.
Resumen
Este artículo estudia reglas fi scales sencillas para estabilizar la deuda pública frente a 
perturbaciones de demanda asimétricas para un país perteneciente a una unión monetaria. 
Comparamos reglas que ajustan los impuestos con otras que ajustan el gasto público. 
Aunque podría parecer imposible ajustar rápida y fl exiblemente el gasto público, por razones 
institucionales o de información, describimos una manera concreta de hacerlo: determinar 
los salarios públicos y las transferencias sociales en una unidad de cuenta alternativa, y 
delegar la valoración de este numerario a una autoridad fi scal independiente.
Para estudiar estas reglas fi scales, construimos un modelo dinámico y estocástico de 
equilibrio general de una economía pequeña y abierta en una unión monetaria, con 
rigideces nominales y emparejamiento aleatorio en el mercado laboral. Utilizando el modelo, 
comparamos las fl uctuaciones de la economía bajo varias reglas fi scales que conllevan 
la misma reducción en la desviación estándar de la deuda pública. Según nuestras 
simulaciones, en comparación con reglas basadas en ajustes impositivos, una regla que 
estabiliza el presupuesto a base de ajustar los salarios públicos y las transferencias reduce 
las fl uctuaciones del consumo, del empleo, y de los salarios reales después de impuestos 
en los sectores privado y público. De esta manera, acerca la economía de mercado a la 
solución que escogería un planifi cador social.
Palabras claves: Autoridad fi scal, salarios públicos, deuda soberana, unión monetaria.
Códigos JEL: E24, E32, E62, F41.
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1 Introduction
Beginning in the spring of 2010, speculative attacks on European public debt, starting
in Greece but rapidly spreading to other Mediterranean countries and to Ireland, have
called into question the design of the Economic and Monetary Union. The crisis has
been accompanied by calls for a more complete fiscal union to backstop the monetary
union, for example:
“... it is clear that a minimal fiscal Europe is necessary to make up for the
loss of independent monetary policy as a sovereign default prevention
mechanism.” (Buiter and Rahbari, 2010)
Calls like these seemed somewhat fanciful even a year ago. But at the time of this
writing (October 2011) the ECB has stepped in to back the sovereign bonds of sev-
eral member states, and European governments are in almost daily negotiations to
strengthen and expand the European Financial Stability Facility, opening the door to
possible large fiscal transfers across countries. The moral hazard this implies is leading
European leaders to impose strict reforms on member states seeking support, and there
is renewed talk of constitutional changes to further integrate fiscal policy.
Regardless of whether a fiscal union is eventually established or not, European
countries will need to find mechanisms to better control their public debt levels. Inside
a fiscal union, this will be necessary to prevent moral hazard problems; in the absence
of a fiscal union, it will be necessary to avoid debt levels that imply a risk of speculative
attack. There are many possible margins, some more effective than others, that could
be adjusted to control the public debt; moreover, different margins of adjustment will
have different effects on the rest of the macroeconomy. Therefore, this paper compares
the budgetary and macroeconomic implications of several fiscal rules that could be
employed to reduce fluctuations in public debt. We consider both tax adjustments and
spending adjustments as possible instruments for controlling debt. In particular, we
discuss how high-frequency public spending adjustments might serve to stabilize the
government budget without amplifying business cycle fluctuations. This might seem
counterintuitive, since it is commonly assumed that discretionary spending cannot be
adjusted quickly, and since “automatic stabilizers” of the business cycle increase deficits
in recessions (Friedman 1948), but we believe this conventional wisdom fails to consider
a sufficiently wide set of possible fiscal instruments. In the next subsection, we discuss
in detail how to design a fiscal framework in which public spending could serve as a
high-frequency stabilizer both for the budget and for the business cycle.
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1.1 A framework for rapid fiscal adjustments
According to the textbook Mundell-Fleming model (Mundell 1961), asymmetric de-
mand shocks are amplified inside a currency union. Independent monetary policies
can no longer offset these shocks; this gives individual countries an incentive to use
fiscal policy to offset them. However, large macroeconomic shocks like those of the
recent crisis can lead rapidly to fiscal difficulties even if the previous fiscal stance was
responsible. Figures 1-4 show how recently Spain seemed to be a prudent, low-debt
country, whereas it is now perceived to be near the front line of attack in the ongoing
sovereign debt crisis.1 This problem is aggravated by the fact that when a country
emits debt in a currency it does not control, the probability of a self-fulfilling attack
on the currency is increased (Eichengreen and Hausmann 2005; De Grauwe 2010). It
is further aggravated by the instability of cross-border banking flows in a monetary
union (Bruche and Sua´rez, 2010).
On the other hand, membership of a monetary union implies that in principle, re-
sources could be transferred from other union members to fight a speculative attack
on any particular country’s debt. That is, fiscal stabilization could be simplified by
creating a fiscal union to accompany the monetary union. Obviously though, moral
hazard issues arise: there is less incentive for countries to run responsible fiscal policies
if they expect to be bailed out by partners when they have solvency difficulties. This
moral hazard problem has the potential to deepen political tensions within the Euro-
zone as countries that transfer resources demand the imposition of reforms on recipient
countries. The failure of the proposed European Constituion already showed growing
skepticism about further integration among the European public, and tension across
EU members is now openly visible as peripheral countries protest against imposed
reforms and core countries protest against the dangers of a “transfer union”.
If political tensions make substantial cross-border transfers impossible, fiscal union
may not be sufficient to maintain stability of the monetary union. On the other hand,
since any mechanism capable of guaranteeing long-term budget balance at the na-
tional level could prevent the speculative attacks that are destabilizing the monetary
union today, fiscal union is in principle not logically necessary either. So, does any
1Figures 1 and 2 report the debt and deficit situation for an aggregate of the Euro area, Belgium,
Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom for 2007
and 2009. All data displayed in figures come from Eurostat. Quantities in Figs. 1-2 correspond to
government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP, and net lending ( + ) or borrowing (-) in
ESA 1995 as a percentage of GDP, respectively. Note that most of these countries went from surpluses
or balance in 2007 into deficits in 2009 (Greece is exceptional in that it was already running a large
deficit in 2007).
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Figure 1: International comparison of debt-to-GDP ratios.
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Figure 2: International comparison of deficit-to-GDP ratios.
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institutional arrangement for ensuring national solvency exist? In recent years, many
economists have proposed that budget stability could be greatly enhanced by delegat-
ing some fiscal decisions to an independent authority, modeled along the lines of an
independent central bank.2 This paper also advocates fiscal delegation. But unlike pre-
vious literature on independent fiscal authorities, our paper also addresses the question:
does budget stabilization necessarily destabilize output over the business cycle? After
all, the Stability and Growth Pact has been widely criticized for its potential to am-
plify recessions by requiring fiscal retrenchment when output falls. And any tax-based
mechanism for maintaining budget stability seems likely to have similar implications.
2Prominent examples include von Hagen and Harden (1995), Blinder (1997), Eichengreen et al.
(1999), Calmfors (2003), Wyplosz (2005), and Leeper (2009). The theory of independent fiscal au-
thorities is surveyed by Debrun, Hauner, and Kumar (2009).
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Figure 3: Evolution of Spanish public debt: 1995-2009.
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Figure 4: Evolution of Spanish public deficit: 1995-2009.
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Yet handing control of spending to an independent authority seems harder to do, since
public spending decisions are complex, multi-dimensional, and inherently political.
However, rapid and flexible control of the spending side could be facilitated by
setting up a formal framework for adjusting public salaries and transfers.3 Empirical
evidence suggests that these margins of fiscal policy have a particularly durable bud-
getary effect (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Corsetti, Meier, and Mueller, 2009). Moreover,
focusing budgetary retrenchment on public salaries and transfers has the advantage of
3Gomes (2009) shows that the government would optimally decrease public sector wages in reces-
sions, or when public spending needs rise. Our model has similar implications, even though we assume
that the public sector wages are subject to a sticky bargaining process, instead of being freely chosen
by the government.
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promoting competitiveness by fostering a real devaluation when the economy falls into
recession. These margins have recently featured in many governments’ ad hoc responses
to the crisis; here we advocate a more permanent mechanism for adjusting them.
Rapid adjustment of the many different items of salaries and transfers requires the
definition of some across-the-board shift parameter affecting all these items simulta-
neously. A possible way to do this would be to set public salaries, and various public
transfer payments, in an alternative unit of account.4 An independent fiscal authority
at the national level would set the exchange rate X: the euro value of one unit of the
alternative currency. The fiscal authority would take into account tax policy, govern-
ment expenditure policy, and the state of the business cycle, resetting X regularly for
consistency with a long-run target level for public debt. The fiscal authority would also
have the mandate, at most once per year, to shift up or down the schedule of income
taxes or VAT rates.
For a concrete example, consider the following scenario for the case of Spain.5
Imagine that the government legally defines one “civil service unit” (CSU) as the base
salary of civil servants of type “Funcionario A”. Civil servants and transfer recipients
would be paid in euros, but contracts would be negotiated in CSU; for example, the
unions and the government might agree to set the base salary of a “Funcionario B”
to 1.2 CSU. The government would legally delegate to an independent agency the
choice of X, the value of one CSU in euros. The base salary of each Funcionario A
would therefore be X euros, and the base salary of each Functionario B would be 1.2X
euros. This fiscal authority could be based in Madrid, for better access to local fiscal
information; or it could be based in Brussels, where it would be more clearly sheltered
from local political pressures. It could be set up as one of many national fiscal agencies
as part of a European system; but it would also be beneficial to any solvent EMU
member country to set up such an agency for itself. The fiscal authority would publish
the new value of X, monthly, at a date sufficiently early to allow the processing of
that month’s paychecks. The authority would choose X at a level consistent with long-
term balance of the government budget. Nonetheless, it would permit deficit spending
during recessions, to be compensated by surpluses during economic expansions.
Notice that on one hand, this system helps protect the economy from the amplifi-
cation of shocks associated with a currency union. It does so by directly attacking the
4Buiter (2007) studies monetary policy when the medium of exchange differs from the unit of
account.
5Political economy issues related to this framework, and more institutional details about how it
could be implemented, are discussed in a companion paper, Costain and de Blas (2011).
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Figure 5: Evolution of components of Spanish public expenditure: 2007-2009.
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Figure 6: Evolution of components of Spanish public revenues: 2007-2009.
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root cause of the problem: nominal rigidity in the common currency.6 Obviously, the
standard textbook analysis of asymmetric demand shocks in a currency union assumes
nominal rigidity: there would be no cost to giving up a flexible exchange rate if a coun-
try could frictionlessly adjust its internal price and wage levels.7 The implications of
6One example of the importance of nominal rigidity in public spending is the continued increase
in compensation of Spanish public employees (by 2% of Spanish GDP) in 2007-09 in the midst of the
financial crisis, as seen in Fig. 5. The figure also shows that compensation of public employees and
social transfers make up roughly 60% of total government expenditure in Spain. Thus an adjustment
along these two margins represents an across-the-board shift in the large majority of expenditure.
7Like us, Farhi, Gopinath, and Itskhokhi (2011) show that the loss of an independent monetary
instrument in a currency union may be undone by considering policy instruments ignored in the
standard textbook analysis. However, their proposal requires coordinated changes in four different
tax rates in response to shocks; the mechanisms discussed here may be simpler for policy makers to
implement.
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the New Keynesian DSGE model we develop here are similar to those of the traditional
analysis, and the details of our proposed mechanism are also based on a similar logic.
Public spending is distributed over a huge number of distinct items; if we assumed it
were informationally feasible for a monopsonistic government to readjust its prices for
these items quickly and cheaply, we would be assuming away the problem of nominal
stickiness (in fact, we would be assuming central planning works). Therefore we re-
strict the problem of the fiscal authority to choosing one or two numbers: an exchange
rate between public and private numeraires, and a shift parameter for the tax code.
The forecasting expertise necessary to make these decisions would be similar to the
expertise required by an independent central bank setting an interest rate.
Note also that as a purely nominal shift, setting an exchange rate between the
public and private units of account would be neutral in the absence of nominal rigidities.
Nonetheless, our numerical model will show that for realistic degrees of wage stickiness,
the CSU mechanism has a powerful effect on the government budget. And while some
alternative mechanisms might at first seem equivalent— for example, sector-specific tax
rates for private and public employees— we do not see any alternatives that would be
as informationally cheap as the one we analyze here. For example, since some workers
are simultaneously employed by the private and public sectors, implementing sector-
specific tax rates would require rewriting the tax code to define how marginal rates
interact across the two types of income. In contrast, our mechanism for adjusting the
value of the public unit of account would require no changes in Spanish tax regulations
or labor market regulations.
Analysis of the CSU mechanism brings up a variety of issues, but above all it brings
up two very different questions which we are addressing in separate papers. First, is
it desirable to delegate some aspects of fiscal policy to an independent authority, and
if so, is it politically feasible? We emphasize that this question is not addressed here;
we review the relevant political economy literature in our companion paper, Costain
and de Blas (2011).8 Second, if control of some fiscal decisions is to be delegated to
an independent agency, precisely which fiscal instruments should the authority control
in order to stabilize both the business cycle and the government finances? This is
a question of macroeconomic dynamics rather than political economy, and it is the
question we address here. We do so by constructing a sticky-price DSGE matching
8For a skeptical discussion of independent fiscal authorities, see Wren-Lewis (2010). For a more
optimistic viewpoint, see Wyplosz (2008).
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model of a small open economy in the context of a currency union. Bargaining in the
private sector takes place in euros; bargaining in the public sector is assumed to take
place (by law) in an alternative unit of account, called the CSU. Note that since workers
may find jobs in either sector, a decrease in real public wages due to a decrease in the
value of the CSU will feed across to the private sector as well. The model represents
the action of the fiscal authority by two rules. The first rule sets the exchange rate X—
the euro value of one CSU— on a period-by-period basis, following a rule that reacts
to the level of public debt, the level of output, and the level of government spending
(relative to steady-state output). The second rule sets the tax rate on labor income,
τ , as a function of the same variables.
Our analysis compares various rules designed to stabilize the government budget.
That is, starting from a baseline fiscal policy in which the public debt exhibits large
fluctuations, we compare several different fiscal rules that all reduce the standard devi-
ation of the public debt by the same amount. We focus on shocks to foreign prices, an
export demand shifter, government spending, and the interest rate in the rest of the
union, since these are asymmetric shocks to which an argument like that of Mundell
(1961) could apply. In order to get some initial intuition about the rigidities implied
by sharing a single currency, we first analyze how the economy reacts to shocks when
the degree of nominal rigidity in the economy varies. Lower stickiness (in either prices
or wages) stabilizes both total debt and labor, and brings consumption closer to the
social planner’s solution. Then we fix the degree of nominal rigidity and study the
macroeconomic implications of policy rules that adjust the tax rate τ or the public-
sector exchange rate X in response to macroeconomic and/or budgetary conditions.
We find that if debt is stabilized by varying the tax rate, fluctuations in consumption
and labor are amplified by a nontrivial amount. We find that imposing public wage
bargaining in a fictitious currency, whose value is determined by a fiscal authority, can
stabilize debt while reducing business cycle fluctuations in consumption and labor. In
fact, even after-tax public wages fluctuate less in the latter case than they would if
debt were stabilized by means of tax instruments.
The remainder of this paper builds a model and uses it to analyze the budgetary
and cyclical implications of different fiscal rules. Section 2 defines preferences and tech-
nologies and states the social planner’s problem. Section 3 describes a decentralized
market equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes how the various inefficiencies of the decen-
tralized equilibrium alter the economy’s response to shocks. Finally, Section 5 studies
different fiscal rules that help stabilize the government budget in the market economy,
comparing how each rule stabilizes or destabilizes the cyclical fluctuations of several
macroeconomic variables. Section 6 concludes.
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2 A small open economy facing asymmetric demand
shocks
In this section we describe a small open economy that suffers business cycles driven by
asymmetric demand shocks. Before considering a decentralized market version of the
economy, we study the social planner’s solution, as a benchmark for comparison.
Since we wish to analyze the effects of adjusting public sector wages, our model
distinguishes private- from public-sector employment. We assume that employment
cannot be instantly reallocated from one sector to the other; we therefore model em-
ployment in terms of a matching technology. The reason we consider a matching model,
instead of a competitive labor market without adjustment frictions, is that it allows us
to study an equilibrium in which wages differ (but interact) across sectors.
2.1 Preferences over final goods
There is a unit mass of households in the home country. Their lifetime utility function
is
Et
∞∑
l=0
βl−t
(
c1−η0t − 1
1− η0 − χn
n1+ψnt
1 + ψn
)
, (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is a constant discount factor, ct denotes consumption, and nt denotes
total labor supply.
Following Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), the final consumption good is a CES aggregate
of home and foreign goods:
ct =
[
(1− αf )
1
η1 (cht )
η1−1
η1 + α
1
η1
f (c
f
t )
η1−1
η1
] η1
η1−1
. (2)
Home consumption cht is itself a CES aggregate with elasticity of substitution η2, across
a unit mass of differentiated home retail goods, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]:
cht =
(∫ 1
0
(
chj,t
) η2−1
η2 dj
) η2
η2−1
. (3)
We assume η2 > η1: demand is more elastic across differentiated retail goods than it
is between domestic and foreign aggregates.
Foreigners also value the same aggregate of home retail goods that the home house-
holds do. Their aggregate purchases of these goods are denoted cxt :
cxt =
(∫ 1
0
(
cxj,t
) η2−1
η2 dj
) η2
η2−1
. (4)
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Finally, the government also demands a CES aggregate of differentiated goods,
which we will call public goods, to distinguish them from the retail goods consumed
by the households. For simplicity, we assume the same functional form and the same
elasticity in the public sector as in the retail sector. Thus aggregate government con-
sumption gt is given by
gt =
(∫ 1
0
(gj,t)
η2−1
η2 dj
) η2
η2−1
, (5)
2.2 Production and matching technologies
Differentiated goods are indexed both by sector, i ∈ {h, g}, where h indicates the retail
sector and g indicates the public sector, and by j ∈ [0, 1], which refers to a specific
good produced in that sector. Production yij,t of good j in sector i is given by a trivial
linear production function:
yij,t = k
i
j,t , (6)
where kij,t is the quantity of intermediate inputs used to produce y
i
j,t.
Intermediate inputs kit are sector-specific. They are produced linearly, using labor
as the only input, according to the production function
kit = an
i
t , (7)
where a represents labor productivity and nit is labor supplied to sector i ∈ {h, g}.
Households can only supply labor by finding appropriate jobs, which occurs through
a matching technology. The number of jobs filled in period t is given by the matching
function
am (u
s
t)
αu v1−αut , (8)
where vt is the number of vacant jobs in the economy, and u
s
t is the number of effective
job searchers, with am > 0 and αu ∈ (0, 1). The ratio θt = vt/ust will be called “labor
market tightness”.
We assume all searchers have the same probability of finding a job, so this proba-
bility is
st = amθ
1−αu
t ≡ s(θt), (9)
Similarly, the probability of a vacancy being filled is
qt = amθ
−αu
t ≡ q(θt), (10)
implying s(θt) = θtq(θt).
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Matching is random, so a searcher may find a job in either sector. Thus, if we write
vacancies in the private and public sectors as vht and v
g
t , respectively, with v
h
t +v
g
t = vt,
then a searcher’s probability of finding a job in sector i ∈ {h, g} is
sit = s(θt)
vit
vt
. (11)
The dynamics of employment in sector i are
nit = (1− δn)nit−1 + q(θt)vit , (12)
where δn is an exogenous match separation rate.
Both the workers unemployed at time t − 1, and those who just lost their jobs at
the end of t− 1, are included in the search pool for time t jobs. That is,
ust = 1− nt−1 + δnnt−1 = 1− (1− δn)nt−1. (13)
This timing implies (as in Blanchard and Gal´ı, 2009) that some workers and vacancies
find matches immediately, without spending a full period unemployed, so that employ-
ment can adjust to shocks immediately along the extensive margin.9 Following Thomas
(2008), the cost of creating vit vacancies in sector i at time t is
10
χv
1 + ψv
(
vit
nit−1
)ψv
vit . (14)
This cost is denominated in units of the sector-i intermediate good.
2.3 Aggregate consistency conditions
Total intermediate goods used in sector i must equal the total quantity produced:11∫ 1
0
kij,tdj = k
i
t = an
i
t −
χv
1 + ψv
(
vit
nit−1
)ψv
vit (15)
9Given our quarterly calibration, this timing assumption avoids imposing an unrealistic lower
bound on the length of an unemployment spell.
10This cost function is applicable at all scales. Thus, in the decentralized economy, if a firm l in
sector i with lagged employment nil,t−1 creates v
i
l,t vacancies, it pays
χv
1+ψv
(
vil,t
nil,t−1
)ψv
vil,t units of the
sector-i intermediate good to do so.
11Eq. (15) assumes vacancy costs are paid by the planner. When we define the market economy we
must integrate these costs across decentralized producers of intermediate goods.
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Likewise, for each differentiated good j in each sector, the quantity used must equal
the quantity produced:
chj,t + c
x
j,t = y
h
j,t = k
h
j,t, (16)
gj,t = y
g
j,t = k
g
j,t, (17)
respectively. Also, total labor supplied must equal employment in the two sectors:
nt = n
h
t + n
g
t . (18)
Total income and spending need not be equalized in the small open economy, be-
cause it can borrow and lend from the rest of the world. Transactions with the rest of
the world are denominated in a currency which we will call the euro. P ft will represent
the price of the imported consumption good cft , and P
x
j,t will be the price of exports of
retail good j, so the nominal trade balance will equal
∫ 1
0
P xj,tc
x
j,tdj − P ft cft . The price
of home country bonds emitted in euros at time t will be 1
RtIt
, where Rt − 1 is the
world interest rate, and It − 1 is a risk premium on home country bonds. Therefore
the dynamics of the debt of the small open economy (in euros) are
Dt
RtIt
= Dt−1 + P
f
t c
f
t −
∫ 1
0
P xj,tc
x
j,tdj (19)
where Dt is the euro face value of debt emitted at t, to be paid off at time t+ 1.
The risk premium that makes foreign lenders willing to accept home country debt
is assumed to vary with the level of debt:12
It = exp
(
ψI
(
Dt
PYss
− d
))
(20)
Here PYss represents the steady-state value, in euros, of home country output; ψI > 0
and d are parameters.
2.4 Shock processes
The home country is regarded as a small open economy; the rest of the world is a
monetary union, of which the home country is an infinitesimal member. Since our focus
is on the home country, we treat the behavior of the rest of the world as exogenous.
Thus, the rest of the world determines the real interest rate, which follows an exogenous
stochastic process:
Rt
R∗ =
(
Rt−1
R∗
)ρR
exp(
Rt ), (21)
12Up to a first-order approximation, this premium is equivalent to that assumed by Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2003).
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where 
Rt is a mean-zero, normal shock.
Likewise, the foreign price level follows an exogenous stochastic process:
P ft
P f∗
=
(
P ft−1
P f∗
)ρf
exp(
ft ), (22)
where 
ft is a mean-zero normal shock. Gross exports depend negatively on the price
of the local good, as well as an exogenous shifter:
cxt = χ
x
t
(
P xt
P ft
)−η3
, (23)
χxt
χx∗
=
(
χxt−1
χx∗
)ρx
exp(
xt ), (24)
where 
xt is a mean-zero normal shock. It is natural to assume η2 > η3 > η1, that is,
the elasticity of demand for any given firm’s output is greater than that for any given
country’s output, which is greater than that between domestic and foreign aggregates.
Finally, since our paper focuses mainly on the financing of government purchases,
rather than their level, we treat government demand as an exogenous process:
gt
gj
=
(
gt−1
g∗
)ρg
exp(
gt ), (25)
where 
gt is a mean-zero normal shock.
2.5 Social planner’s problem
In order to have an efficient benchmark against which to compare the effects of policy in
the decentralized equilibrium, we now consider the problem of a planner who maximizes
the welfare (1) of the representative household of the small open economy, taking as
given the technology and constraints described in Section 3, including the behavior of
the rest of the world.
The planner must respect the exogenous process for government purchases, but
can costlessly reassign financial resources across domestic agents (in other words, the
planner can levy lump sum taxes). While the planner controls economic activity in
the small open economy, it takes as given the behavior of the monetary union (the rest
of the world), including the exogenous shock processes governing the interest rate rt,
the foreign price level P ft , and the level of demand for domestic exports χ
x
t , as well as
foreigners’ Dixit-Stiglitz preferences across domestic retail goods. Finally, the planner
can borrow and save in international markets in euro-denominated bonds, subject to
a risk premium It that depends on the real debt-to-output ratio.
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In the absence of sticky prices and wages that will affect the decentralized version of
this economy, all firms are identical in this model. Therefore the social planner prefers
a symmetric solution across all differentiated products. Imposing symmetry, so that
chj,t ≡ cht , cxj,t ≡ cxt , and so forth, the social planner’s problem is:
max
Dt,It,ct,cht ,c
x
t ,P
x
t ,v
h
t ,v
g
t ,n
h
t ,n
g
t ,θt
Et
∞∑
l=0
βl−t
(
c1−η0t − 1
1− η0 − χn
(nht + n
g
t )
1+ψn
1 + ψn
)
(26)
subject to: (27)
Dt
RtIt
= Dt−1 + P
f
t c
f
t − P xt cxt (28)
ct =
[
(1− αf )
1
η1 (cht )
η1−1
η1 + α
1
η1
f (c
f
t )
η1−1
η1
] η1
η1−1
(29)
cxt = χ
x
t
(
P xt
P ft
)−η3
(30)
cht + c
x
t = an
h
t −
χv
1 + ψv
(
vht
nht−1
)1+ψv
nht−1 (31)
gt = an
g
t −
χv
1 + ψv
(
vgt
ngt−1
)1+ψv
ngt−1 (32)
nht = (1− δn)nht−1 + amθ−αut vht (33)
ngt = (1− δn)ngt−1 + amθ−αut vgt (34)
θt =
vht + v
g
t
1− (1− δn)(nht−1 + ngt−1)
(35)
ln It = ψI
(
Dt
PssYss
− d¯
)
(36)
and subject to the four shock processes (21), (22), (24), and (25).
Equation (28) states the budget constraint for the social planner: it describes the
evolution of total national debt, in euros, as a function of the trade balance. Note that
(30) implies that the social planner acts as if the local economy were a monopolistic
competitor– it chooses the price of the exported good, P xt , taking into account the world
demand curve for those exports. Equations (33)-(35) describe the matching technology
that restricts the planner’s ability to reassign labor across sectors; equations (31)-(32)
describe total production in the private and public sectors, taking into account the
linear production technology. Two key implications of the planner’s solution are the
Euler equations that govern vacancies in sectors i ∈ {h, g}:
λnit = aλ
yi
t −χn(nt)ψn+βEt
[
λyit+1
χvψv
1 + ψv
(zit+1)
1+ψv + (1− δn)(λnit+1 − λθt+1θt+1)
]
(37)
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where λyit represents the multipliers on constraints (31)-(32), λ
ni
t represents the multi-
pliers on constraints (33)-(34), and λθt is the multiplier on (35).
Shortly, we will analyze impulse responses of the planner’s problem with respect
to the shocks in the model. But first, we define a decentralized equilibrium of this
economy in the context of a monetary union, so that we can compare the two side by
side.
3 The small open economy in a currency union
Now that we have defined an optimal allocation in this economic environment, we next
consider how a market economy responds to these shocks. In particular, we assume
that the small open economy defined above forms part of a monetary union. Unlike
the planner’s economy, we assume that the market economy faces nominal rigidities in
price and wage adjustment. Since the labor market is subject to search frictions, we
will assume that wages are intermittently adjusted through a Nash bargaining process.
3.1 Decision makers in the decentralized economy
In the decentralized economy, households choose consumption over time. They supply
labor through a random matching technology, and borrow or lend as necessary to
finance consumption in response to their fluctuating income.
Retailers purchase intermediate goods, and resell them, monopolistically, as differ-
entiated final goods. One set of retailers acts in the private sector, and another in the
public sector.
Intermediate goods producers hire workers through a random matching technology
to produce intermediate goods, which they sell in a competitive market. The interme-
diate good used in the private sector differs from that used in the public sector; one
set of producers serves the private sector, while another serves the public sector (we
sometimes refer to these public sector producers as “government agencies”).
The government demands an aggregate of differentiated final goods. The total
quantity demanded is simply treated as an exogenous stochastic process.
Control of one or more parameters of fiscal policy is assumed to be delegated to a
fiscal authority. The fiscal authority’s decision is represented by a rule that determines
the delegated parameter as a function of observable macroeconomic data.
Behavior of the rest of the world is exogenous from the point of view of the home
economy. It affects the home economy by determining interest rates, determining an
interest premium on home country debt as a function of the debt level, supplying an
import good, and demanding the home export good.
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3.2 Households
Households maximize the utility function (1) subject to the following period budget
constraint:
Dht
RtIht P
c
t
=
Dht−1
P ct
+ ct− (1− τt)
[∫ 1
0
whl,tn
h
l,tdl +
∫ 1
0
wgk,tn
g
k,tdk
]
− (1−nt)bt−Divt. (38)
Here Dht is nominal household debt emitted in period t, and P
c
t is the consumer price
index. RtI
h
t is the gross nominal interest rate, where Rt is the world interest rate, and
Iht is a risk premium. The household owns the firms, receiving a dividend payment
Divt. The household pays a flat tax rate τt on its labor income, which is derived from
employment at a continuum of private firms l and a continuum of government agencies
k. Employment of household members at firm l is nhl,t, and these workers earn real
wage whl,t; the employment and real wage at agency k are n
g
l,t and w
g
l,t. Unemployed
members of the household receive a subsidy bt; nt =
∫ 1
0
nhl,tdl +
∫ 1
0
ngk,tdk = n
h
t + n
g
t is
the fraction of household members employed.
Notice that this budget constraint implies that household members insure one an-
other by sharing labor income between the employed and unemployed. The household
does not choose employment directly; instead, it is determined in equilibrium by a
process of matching and bargaining.
Since the household knows that the interest premium rises with debt, its consump-
tion Euler equation is(
1− D
h
t (I
h)′(Dht )
Iht
)
c−η0t = RtI
h
t P
c
t βEt
c−η0t+1
P ct+1
, (39)
where (Ih)′(Dht ) is the derivative of I
h
t with respect to D
h
t . The household allocates
expenditure across imported goods cft and the home aggregate c
h
t to minimize the cost
of attaining its total aggregate consumption ct, given its aggregation preferences (2).
The resulting demand functions are:
cht = (1− αf )
(
P ht
P ct
)−η1
ct, c
f
t = αf
(
P ft
P ct
)−η1
ct, (40)
Here P ht and P
f
t are price aggregates for domestic and foreign goods, and the domestic
consumer price index P ct is defined as
P ct =
[
(1− αf )
(
P ht
)1−η1
+ αf
(
P ft
)1−η1] 11−η1
. (41)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1207
Likewise, its preferences (3) across differentiated retail goods imply that the demand
function for good j is:
chj,t =
(
P hj,t
P ht
)−η2
cht , (42)
where P hj,t denotes the price of the intermediate good j, and P
h
t is a price index for
domestically-produced private-sector goods: i
P ht =
(∫ 1
0
(
P hj,t
)η2−1
dj
) 1
η2−1
. (43)
3.3 Final goods producers
Allocation of demand across differentiated products by foreigners and the government
is analogous to (42). Therefore, the private retailers and government agencies that
produce the differentiated goods j and k, respectively, act as monopolistic competitors
facing the following demand curves:
Y hj,t =
(
P hj,t
P ht
)−η2
Y ht , where Y
h
t = c
h
t + c
x
t , (44)
Y gk,t =
(
P gk,t
P gt
)−η2
gt, where Y
g
t ≡ gt. (45)
Each of these final producers, in sectors i ∈ {h, g}, operates a linear production
function that depends on a homogeneous intermediate input, purchased at nominal
price P ct φ
i
t. As in Calvo (1983), prices are “sticky” for a random number of periods.
Each period, a firm gets the chance to adjust its price with probability 1− ξp, or with
probability ξp its price remains constant: P
i
j,t = P
i
j,t−1. If it gets to reset its price in
period t, it sets its new price P˜ ij,t to maximize expected discounted profits over the
periods in which this price remains fixed. Thus its decision problem is:
max
P˜ ij,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
βt,t+s (ξp)
s
(
P˜ ij,t − P ct+sφit+s
)( P˜ ij,t
P it+s
)−η2
Y it+s (46)
where βt,t+s = β
(
ct+s
ct
)−η0
is the household’s stochastic discount factor for aggregate
consumption. This implies the following price setting equation:
η2 − 1
η2
P˜ ij,tEt
∞∑
s=0
(βξp)
s c
−η0
t+s
c−η0t
(
P˜ ij,t
P it+s
)−η2
Y it+s = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βξp)
s c
−η0
t+s
c−η0t
(
P˜ ij,t
P it+s
)−η2
P ct+sφ
i
t+sY
i
t+s,
(47)
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from which it is clear that all firms which reset their price in period t set it at the same
level (P˜ ij,t = P˜
i
t , for all j ∈ (0, 1)).
Given probability ξp of updating in any given period, we average over all contracts
to express the dynamics of the aggregate price level as follows:
P it =
(
(1− ξp)
(
P˜ it
)η2−1
+ ξp
(
P it−1
)η2−1) 1η2−1 . (48)
Combining (47) and (48) and log-linearizing around a zero inflation steady state
yields the New Keynesian Phillips curve for sector i:
πˆit = βEtπˆ
i
t+1 +
(1− ξp)(1− βξp)
ξp
(φˆit + Pˆ
c
t − Pˆ it ). (49)
Also, given prices and quantities in the two sectors, we can define nominal GDP as
PtYt = P
h
t
(
cht + c
x
t
)
+ P gt gt
where Pt is the GDP deflator, and Yt is real GDP. Note that in what follows, we never
need to solve for the GDP deflator and real GDP separately to solve the model; only
nominal GDP enters the analysis.
3.4 Intermediate goods producers
In the private sector, a continuum of intermediate goods firms, indexed by l, sell
their output competitively to the retailers at price P ct φ
h
t . For simplicity, we make
an analogous assumption for the public sector: a continuum of government agencies
produce intermediate goods for the government, valuing their production at the price
P ct φ
g
t . Each of these producers operates in only one sector (private or public). Without
loss of generality, we set the mass of producers in each sector to one.13
In both sectors (i ∈ {h, g}), intermediate goods are produced according to a linear
production function with labor as the only input:
yil,t = an
i
l,t, (50)
where nil,t denotes the number of members of the household employed by producer l
in sector i; and a is the constant level of productivity. We assume that each producer
13The reason this implies no loss of generality is that we assume a technology with constant returns
to scale. Thus the model determines the total amount produced in each sector, but has nothing to
say about how it is distributed across producers.
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l posts vacancies to hire workers, and bargains with workers to determine the wage.
Posting vacancies entails the costs (14), scaled to the level of employment in the firm:
χv
1 + ψv
(
vil,t
nilt−1
)1+ψv
nil,t−1, (51)
in units of the intermediate good.
At time t, the firm takes as given its previous employment stock nil,t−1, and chooses
vil,t to maximize the present discounted value of current and future profits. In doing
so, it takes as given its nominal wage, which is constrained by a Calvo friction, inter-
mittently updated by a Nash bargain that is set in nominal terms. If we write the
value of a match with an individual worker as J it (W il,t), then optimal hiring implies:
χv
(
vil,t
nil,t−1
)ψv
φit = qtJ it (W il,t). (52)
3.5 Wage bargaining
Following Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008), we assume that wages are subject to Calvo
stickiness at the firm level. That is, all workers in a given firm, including new hires, are
paid that firm’s previous period’s wage with a probability ξw, while with probability
1− ξw the firm is free to renegotiate nominal wages with its workforce.14 Those firms
adjusting to the new nominal wage will in equilibrium set the same wage, W i∗t , given
that we have no firm-specific shocks other than the Calvo adjustment process itself.
To model our proposed mechanism for fiscal adjustments on the expenditure side,
we allow for the possibility that public and private wages are bargained in different
units of account. Therefore, we define X it as the exchange rate between the euro and
the bargaining currency. For private firms, Xht ≡ 1— meaning simply that private-
sector wages are set in euros. For public firms, Xgt represents euros per CSU, which
will vary over time depending on the decisions of the fiscal authority.
Written in the bargaining currency, the law of motion of the average nominal wage
is given by:
W it =
∫ 1
0
W il,tdl = ξwW
i
t−1 + (1− ξw)W i∗t , (53)
since fraction 1 − ξw of firms adjust wages each period. But to fully describe wage
dynamics, we must also find an equation for the reset wage W i∗t . To do so, we calculate
match surplus for workers and firms, and then derive a Nash bargaining equation.
14We focus on the case of equal Calvo parameters in the public and private sectors. This assumption
is not crucial for our results.
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Given the probabilities of labor market transitions, the value in consumption units
of a worker with a job in sector i is:
W il,t = (1− τt)
X itW
i
l,t
P ct
− χnnψnt cη0t + Etβt,t+1
[
δn(1− s(θt+1))Ut+1 + (1− δn)W il,t+1
+δns(θt+1)
∫ 1
0
vhL,t+1WhL,t+1 + vgL,t+1WgL,t+1
vt+1
dL
]
.
On the right-hand side, we see that a worker employed at time t stays in the same
producer at time t+1 with probability 1−δn, and becomes unemployed with probability
δn(1− s(θt+1)). With probability δns(θt+1), the worker finds a job in a new producer,
which may either be private (h) or public (g). Here U represents the value of an
unemployed worker, which satisfies:
Ut = bt + Etβt,t+1
[
(1− s(θt+1))Ut+1 + s(θt+1)
∫ 1
0
vhL,t+1WhL,t+1 + vgL,t+1WgL,t+1
vt+1
dL
]
.
(54)
Subtracting these two equations, the household’s surplus, Hil,t ≡ W il,t −Ut will satisfy:
Hil,t = (1− τt)
X itW
i
l,t
P ct
− bt − χnnψnt cη0t + (1− δn)Etβt,t+1Hil,t+1
−Etβt,t+1(1− δn)s(θt+1)
∫ 1
0
vhL,t+1HhL,t+1 + vgL,t+1HgL,t+1
vt+1
dL. (55)
Here s(θt+1)
viL,t+1
vt+1
denotes the probability of becoming matched with producer L in
sector i at time t+ 1.
A similar Bellman equation governs the producer’s surplus, J il,t:15
J il,t = aφit −
X itW
i
l,t
P ct
+ Etβt,t+1max
z
[
(1− δn + qt+1z)J il,t+1 −
χv
1 + ψv
z1+ψvφit+1
]
(56)
or equivalently
J il,t = aφit −
X itW
i
l,t
P ct
+ Etβt,t+1
[
(1− δn) + ψv
1 + ψv
zil,t+1qt+1
]
J il,t+1. (57)
In each period, the wage is renegotiated, in nominal terms, with probability 1− ξw.
Renegotiation is assumed to solve a Nash bargaining problem, with bargaining power
σ for the worker. The first-order condition is
σJ i∗t
∂Hi∗t
∂W i∗t
= (1− σ)Hi∗t
∣∣∣∣ ∂J i∗t∂W i∗t
∣∣∣∣ (58)
15As is standard in matching models, here we have written the producer’s surplus per match after
hiring at time t.
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The notation reflects the fact that any firm in sector i that renegotiates at time t sets
the same nominal wage W i∗t .
Note that as Gertler, Sala, and Trigari pointed out, a marginal change in the
nominal wage is more valuable to the firm than it is to the worker, because it is
applicable not only to the current workforce, but also to new employees hired prior to
the next wage adjustment. Moreover, the worker’s bargaining share is also lowered by
the factor (1− τt), reflecting the fact that given proportional taxes, the worker receives
less benefit from one euro of wages than this euro costs to the firm. Using Bellman
equations (55) and (57), we can calculate the marginal value of the sticky wage to each
bargaining party as follows:
∂Hil,t
∂W
= (1− τt)X
i
t
P ct
+ (1− δn)ξwEtβt,t+1
∂Hil,t+1
∂W
, (59)∣∣∣∣∣∂J il,t∂W
∣∣∣∣∣ = X itP ct + ξwEtβt,t+1(1− δn + qt+1zil,t+1)
∣∣∣∣∣∂J il,t+1∂W
∣∣∣∣∣ . (60)
Solving a matching model with sticky wages is complicated by the fact that the
surpluses of workers and firms differ across matches— we need to evaluate the surpluses
as a function of the current wage. In the appendix, we explain how all surpluses can
be approximated as linear functions of the current wage, and how we can then rewrite
the dynamics in terms of average wages (and average surplus functions) only.
3.6 Monetary and fiscal policy
Three public authorities determine monetary and fiscal policy in the home economy:
the central bank of the monetary union, the home country government, and the home
country fiscal authority.
3.6.1 The central bank
The nominal interest rate is determined by the central bank of the monetary union,
and is therefore exogenous from the point of view of the small open economy under
consideration. It follows the stochastic process (21), as described earlier.
3.6.2 The government
We assume the home-country government undertakes a number of complex economic
tasks, including various forms of public expenditure, and designing a tax code to fi-
nance this expenditure. However, the content of these choices is not crucial for our
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argument, and will not be modeled. Therefore, for simplicity we just treat real gov-
ernment consumption expenditure as an exogenous stochastic process, given by (25),
and we will treat all taxation as if it were just a flat labor income tax.
Finally, for realism, we assume the government makes transfer payments to the
unemployed. The benefit level bt is set to a constant fraction b of the public sector
wage. Given these budget items, the nominal government debt, in euros, evolves as
Dgt
RtI
g
t
= Dgt−1 + P
g
t gt − τt
(
W ht n
h
t +XtW
g
t n
g
t
)
+ (1− nt)XtW gt b. (61)
Here Dgt−1 is the government’s debt, in euros, at the beginning of t, and I
g
t is a risk
premium on government debt; Dgt /(RtI
g
t ) is the amount of new euro debt that must be
issued at t to roll over the existing debt and to finance the deficit. P gt gt is government
spending, in euros. W ht n
h
t h
h
t is the labor income of private sector workers, in euros,
and XtW
g
t n
g
th
g
t is the labor income of public sector workers, in euros. Here the private
sector wage W ht is denominated directly in euros, whereas the public sector wage W
g
t
is denominated in CSU, so it must be multiplied by the “exchange rate” Xt to convert
to euros. The last term in the budget constraint represents the payment of the real
benefit bt = XtW
g
t b/P
c
t to the unemployed.
3.6.3 The fiscal authority
Whereas the government is assumed to make some complex but unmodeled decisions,
the fiscal authority is assumed to make at most two simple decisions: adjusting a
parameter that shifts tax rates, and/or adjusting a parameter that affects the value of
public salaries and transfer payments.
We model these two decisions as rules that depend on observable macroeconomic
data. The tax rule determines an additive shift of all labor income taxes as a function
of deviations of nominal GDP from its trend level, nominal public spending from its
trend level, and public debt, as a fraction of GDP, from a target level:
τt−τ ∗ = ρτ (τt−1 − τ ∗)+(1−ρτ )
[
τ y
(
PtYt − PssYss
PssYss
)
+ τ g
(
P gt gt − P gssgss
PssYss
)
+ τ d
(
Dgt
PssYss
− d∗
)]
(62)
Formally, in this expression, τ ∗ represents a steady-state flat tax rate. However, it
should be interpreted as a stand-in for the whole tax code. That is, the deviations
from τ ∗ determined by the rule (62) should be interpreted as additive shifts of the
whole tax code chosen by the government.
Second, the fiscal authority determines each period’s exchange rate Xt between the
public sector and private sector numeraires (the price of one CSU, in euros). We model
τt−τ ∗ = ρτ (τt−1 − τ ∗)+(1
[
y PtYt − PssYss
PssYss
)
+ τ g
(
P gt gt − P gssgss
PssYs
)
+ τ d
(
Dgt
PssYss
− d∗
)]
(62)
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this decision as a rule that reacts to deviations of nominal GDP and nominal public
spending from their trend levels.16
Xt
X∗
=
(
Xt−1
X∗
)ρx [
exp
(
ζy
(
Pt−1Yt−1 − PssYss
PssYss
))
exp
(
ζg
(
P gt gt − P gssgss
PssYss
))]1−ρx
(63)
Note that the exchange rate is determined as a function of lagged nominal output
rather than current nominal output; this helps avoid indeterminacy.
3.7 Market clearing conditions
Several market clearing conditions that were previously stated in the context of the
planner’s problem must be restated here to properly aggregate the decisions of decen-
tralized decision-makers.
Aggregating vacancy costs at the firm level, the market clearing conditions for the
private and public sector are:
cht + c
x
t = an
h
t −
∫ 1
0
χv
1 + ψv
(zhl,t)
1+ψvnhl,t−1dl (64)
gt = an
g
t −
∫ 1
0
[
χv
1 + ψv
(zgl,t)
1+ψvngl,t−1
]
dl (65)
As with our treatment of wages, aggregation of these heterogeneous hiring expenditures
can be simplified by linearizing around a zero-inflation steady state.
In the decentralized market, market willingness to hold the debt of public and
private decision makers will depend on the current debt level of each borrower. Thus
we assume the following specification for the risk premia Iht and I
g
t :
ln I it = ψ
i
I
(
Dit
PYss
− di
)
(66)
in sectors i ∈ {h, g}. For consistency with the risk premium on the aggregate debt of
the planner we assume d
g
= αgd, d
h
= (1− αg)d, ψgI = ψI/αg, and ψhI = ψI/(1− αg),
where αg represents the fraction of debt capacity attributed to the government.
16This functional form is largely analogous to that used for the tax rate, except that it is multi-
plicative rather than additive. The multiplicative nature of the exchange rate rule ensures that Xt
is always a positive number, whereas the additive tax rule allows us to consider possibilities such as
positive and negative tax rates, or an efficient steady-state tax rate τ∗ = 0.
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3.8 Steady state
In steady state, the relation between employment and tightness is
θss =
(
δnnss
am(1− (1− δn)nss)
) 1
1−αu
(67)
Given the steady-state flow relation δnnss = q(θss)vss, we see that the vacancy-to-
employment ratio z is equalized across sectors in steady state:
ziss = δn/q(θss), i ∈ {h, g}. (68)
Furthermore, in each sector, the real marginal cost φiss, the real wage X
i
ssW
i
ss/P
c
ss,
and the surpluses J iss and Hiss are determined by linear equations: the zero profit
condition on vacancies, the Nash bargaining equation, and the Bellman equations for
the surpluses:
χvz
ψvφiss = q(θss)J iss, (69)
(1− βξw)(1− τss)σJ iss = (1− βξw(1− δn))(1− σ)Hiss, (70)
(1− β(1− δn))Hiss = (1− τss)X issW iss/P css − wss, (71)
(1− β(1− δn/(1 + ψv)))J iss = aφiss −X issW iss/P css. (72)
While these equations are sector-specific, note that no other sector-specific variables
appear in them. Therefore the steady-state solutions for these four variables must
be equalized across sectors: φhss = φ
g
ss, X
h
ssW
h
ss/P
c
ss = X
g
ssW
g
ss/P
c
ss , J hss = J gss, and
Hhss = Hgss. Analogous symmetry holds in the social planner’s solution too.
This has an important consequence for our proposed fiscal mechanism. The fact
that real wages are equalized across sectors in steady state, regardless of the value Xg
of the CSU, implies that changes in the value of the CSU are neutral in the long run
in this model. Thus, any policy effects obtained from setting the value of the CSU
(a purely nominal change) will be only short run effects. This is why we consider a
CSU rule that depends only on short-run fluctuations in output and spending, with
responses to the slow-moving fluctuations in public debt limited to the tax side.17
17Actually, our discussion of the CSU framework in Section 1.1 attempts to create a nominal anchor
by defining the CSU in terms of a specific quantity of public sector labor. If this anchor is sufficiently
strong, the CSU will not be neutral in the long run, and it could be useful to include a term in the
exchange rate rule that devalues the CSU when debt increases. However, the anchor might eventually
fail if those civil servants whose base salary is defined as one CSU manage to renegotiate their contracts
to place less emphasis on base salary and more emphasis on other forms of compensation. Therefore
we ignore this possible anchor in our model, and show that the CSU mechanism can strongly enhance
stability of the budget and the business cycle even without an explicit nominal anchor.
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4 Comparing planner and market solutions
Comparing the first-order conditions of the planner’s problem in any t with the equa-
tions that govern the market economy shows five possible sources of inefficiency in the
market equilibrium:
1. existence of labor market inefficiency wedges such as distorting taxes or unem-
ployment subsidies;
2. possible violation of Hosios’ (1990) condition for efficient bargaining in a matching
economy;
3. monopolistic competition in final goods production;
4. failure to exploit monopoly power in supply of home country exports;
5. nominal rigidities in price and wage setting.
Several of the effects listed above can be seen by adding the workers’ and firms’
surplus equations to obtain an equation for total match surplus in the decentralized
economy. Defining S il,t ≡ Hil,t + J il,t, we can show that the dynamics of total match
surplus are given by
S il,t = aφit − τt
X itW
i
l,t
P ct
− bt − χnnψnt cη0t + Etβt,t+1
ψvχv
1 + ψv
z1+ψvφit+1 (73)
+(1− δn)Etβt,t+1
[
S il,t+1 − s(θt+1) σ
∫ 1
0
vhL,t+1ShL,t+1 + vgL,t+1SgL,t+1
vt+1
dL
]
.
This equation can be compared to the planner’s Euler equation (37) if we interpret the
match value S il,t as a quantity analogous to the planner’s marginal value of employment
λnit , and marginal cost φ
i
t as analogous to planner’s marginal value of intermediate goods
λyit .
18
We first notice that the planner’s Euler equation contains no terms analogous to the
labor tax and unemployment insurance terms that appear in (73). Thus benefits and
labor income taxes should be zero in order to make (37) and (73) equivalent. In turn,
this requires some other source of tax revenues to finance government expenditure; to
avoid introducing other distortions in the model, these would have to be lump sum
taxes. Next, the last term in (73) is the worker’s lost search gains upon accepting
18To compare the equations, note that (37) is written in utility units, whereas (73) is written in
units of consumption goods.
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a match; the last term in (37) is analogous, and can be shown to be algebraically
equivalent if the elasticity of the matching function with respect to search, αu, equals
workers’ share of match surplus, σ. This is Hosios’ (1990) condition for efficiency in
matching models.
A third source of inefficiency in the decentralized economy is the fact that the
monopolistic producers of differentiated final goods mark them up relative to marginal
cost. In steady state, the markup is η2
η2−1 (that is, the steady state of the price-setting
equation (47) reduces to P ij =
η2
η2−1P
cφi.) This inefficiency could be eliminated by
subsidizing the production of differentiated goods at rate 1/η2. Of course, this remedy
is unlikely to be very beneficial unless it can be financed through nondistortionary
taxes.
Another monopolistic incentive arises from the fact that we have defined the planner
as an agent that represents the well-being of the home economy only. Therefore, the
planner has an incentive to restrict trade to exploit the home economy’s market power
as a monopolistic producer of its export good. Tariff policy could be used to achieve
this objective. However, this possibility is not very relevant in the context of this paper,
since we are modeling one member of a monetary union which also functions as a free
trade area. Therefore we will ignore this difference between the market and planner
solutions from here on.
Finally, the market equilibrium differs from the planner’s solution because the plan-
ner, by assumption, is not subject to any nominal rigidities. We will see that price
and wage stickiness and the inefficiency wedges in the value of a job both imply large
differences between the planner and market impulse responses.
4.1 Quantifying the inefficiencies in the decentralized econ-
omy
To have some idea of the quantitative importance of the various inefficiencies in the
market economy, we now provide a rough calibration of the model and calculate impulse
response functions comparing the planner’s solution and the benchmark decentralized
economy to intermediate cases in which some inefficiencies are eliminated.
The parameterization is stated in Table 1. The period is quarterly. We set the
worker’s bargaining power equal to the unemployment elasticity of matching, thus
satisfying Hosios’ condition and thereby eliminating one possible source of inefficiency
in the model. Vacancy cost parameters are calibrated so that vacancy costs amount to
one percent of output, a standard calibration. The separation rate is set at δn = 0.07
per quarter, which is high, but is intended to capture the high share of temporary
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workers in the Spanish economy. Wage and price persistence are set to 0.9 and 0.6,
respectively, which are unlikely to be overestimates, given the high nominal rigidity
that exists in Spain. The size of government and the replacement ratio are both set
lower than the corresponding figures for Spain, so the overall tax wedge τ ∗ is also low;
we choose these conservative figures because our model becomes somewhat unstable if
we raise them further.
Consumption openness is set to 25%, which roughly corresponds to the average of
Spanish imports and exports in recent years. Elasticities of substitution are similar to
those used in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005). The debt elasticity of the risk premium is
a rounding-off of the one assumed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). The level of
debt d¯ at which the risk premium factor begins to exceed one is set to 60% of GDP;
we attribute half of this debt to the private sector and half to the public sector, so
effectively we are assuming that the risk premium kicks in when public debt reaches
half of the Maastricht limit. The parameterization of the fiscal authority’s rules, which
for the benchmark economy sets τ d = 0.01 and all other fiscal parameters to zero, will
be discussed in detail in the next section.
As a first illustration of the impact of the inefficiencies of the market economy, we
solve the benchmark market equilibrium and the planner’s problem and we compare
them to an economy identical to the market benchmark except that all taxes are lump
sum. There are large differences in steady state employment: the planner’s solution has
a 97.6% employment rate, whereas the lump-sum economy has a 96.5% employment
rate, and the market benchmark has an 88.7% employment rate. The tax rule in the
benchmark case is calculated around a base rate of τ ∗ = 30.95%.
Figure 7 reports impulse responses for these three economies with respect to an
export demand shock χx.19 One notable feature of the impulse responses is that private-
and public-sector employment are virtually unchanged by the shock under the planner’s
solution (seen as a thick dashed line). This results from our matching technology, in
which vacancies can be filled immediately, and vacancy costs are paid in units of the
intermediate goods firms’ output. Blanchard and Gal´ı (2009) show that under this
technology, the optimal response to a technology shock is for labor to stay fixed. This
result carries over approximately in our more complex model to the case of export
demand shocks.
In contrast, in the market benchmark economy (thick line), export demand shocks
cause large procyclical swings in private sector employment. While the planner’s solu-
tion, with unchanged employment, implies that home consumption falls to accomodate
19The time unit is quarterly in these impulse responses and all other dynamic results in the paper.
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Table 1: Benchmark parameterization (quarterly)
Parameter Initial value
Preference parameters
Elasticities η0 = 2, η1 = 2, η2 = 8, η3 = 3
Consumption openness αf = 0.25
Labor supply χn = 0.7, ψn = 1
Output and matching technologies
Labor productivity a = 1
Vacancy costs χv calibrated: vacancy costs are 1% of output; ψv = 1
Matching function am calibrated: so that qss=1; αu = 0.5
Separation rate δn = 0.08
Price adjustment parameters
Worker bargaining share σ = αu
Adjustment probabilities 1− ξp = 0.4; 1− ξw = 0.1
Debt demand parameters
Level parameters: d¯ = 2.4, αg = 0.5
Debt elasticity of risk premium ψI = 0.001
Policy parameters
Replacement rate b = 0.35
Level parameters: d∗ = d, X∗ = 1
Level parameter: τ∗ calibrated: so that Dgss/PssYss = d
Elasticities of tax rate τy = 0 (varies), τ g = 0 (varies), τd = 0.01 (varies)
Elasticities of public salaries ζg = 0 (varies), ζy = 0 (varies)
Policy persistence parameters ρx = 0, ρτ = 0
Shock processes Steady state Persistence Std dev of innovation
Government spending gss = 0.2 ρg = 0.95 σg = 0.01
Foreign price level P fss = 1 ρpf = 0.95 σpf = 0.01
Export demand level χxss = αf ρcx = 0.95 σcx = 0.01
Interest rate (quarterly) rss = 0.003 ρr = 0.95 σr = 0.001
increased exports, employment in the market economy expands so much that home con-
sumption rises. We also note that the trade balance fluctuates excessively in response
to the shock, as exports cx rise too much but imports cf do not rise enough.
Replacing distorting labor income taxes by lump sum taxes (thin line) eliminates
much of these inefficient fluctuations. The rise in nh is sufficiently reduced so that home
consumption now falls, though less than it should under the planner’s solution; the
fluctuation in exports is more or less on target with respect to the planner’s solution.
Likewise, for the other three shocks considered in our model, eliminating distorting
labor taxes in favor of lump sum taxes gets rid of most of the inefficient fluctuations
of the market economy. Graphs of these cases are available from the authors.
Next, we look at how nominal rigidities affect the fluctuations of the market econ-
omy. This is particularly interesting in our context since knowing the effects of nominal
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Figure 7: Effects of export demand shock: Planner vs. benchmark vs. lump sum taxes.
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rigidities will help us see whether our proposed mechanism for expenditure adjustment
acts also, as intended, as a mechanism for reducing the effective nominal rigidities in the
economy. Figure 8 compares the impulse responses to an export demand shock across
different degrees of nominal rigidity (the same benchmark and planner solutions are
shown again, as in the previous figure). The benchmark economy (thick line) has wage
persistence ξw = 0.9 at a quarterly rate and price persistence ξp = 0.6. The thinner lines
report alternative parameterizations of stickiness: ξw =∈ {0.75, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0.06},
with ξp =
2
3
ξw in all cases.
20
The effects of eliminating nominal rigidity are very powerful here. Since there are
still other inefficiencies in the model, fully eliminating nominal rigidity drives the im-
pulse responses to a limit that is not exactly equal to the responses of the planner’s
20Varying either Calvo parameter separately has effects qualitatively similar to varying both jointly;
quantitatively the more powerful of the two is ξw.
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Figure 8: Effects of export demand shock: decreasing Calvo stickiness.
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solution. Nonetheless, the reponses are quite close. Just reducing stickiness by 20%,
from 0.9 to 0.75, eliminates more than half the deviation between the market equi-
librium and the planner’s solution, for all the consumption and labor components.
Eliminating stickiness also pushes the dynamics of total debt near to the planner’s
solution, and almost completely stabilizes government debt.21
21While our simulations will treat most variables in log-linear terms, debt will be treated in levels,
since its sign need not be positive. Thus our impulse response functions all show debt fluctuations in
percentage points of GDP; likewise, they show tax rate fluctuations in percentage points. All other
variables are shown in log deviations.
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5 Dynamic effects of simple fiscal rules
5.1 Rules to stabilize public debt
We saw in Section 3.8 that the exchange rate between CSU and euros, being a purely
nominal change, is neutral in steady state. Therefore, while adjustments to the value
of the CSU may potentially be a powerful fiscal and/or macroeconomic instrument,
they can only have “short-run” effects, with a horizon related to the degree of nom-
inal rigidity. This is why our rule (3.6.3) for X depends on current output and/or
government spending but is not conditioned on the debt level, which is a slow-moving
variable.
Since in our model budgetary adjustments are only possible insofar as they are
given by the rules, the only way to ensure a “Ricardian” fiscal policy (one in which the
public sector commits to pay off any debt it incurs, through future fiscal adjustments)
is to ensure that at least one fiscal rule adjusts sufficiently strongly to changes in the
debt level.22
A sufficiently strong fiscal adjustment to any increase in debt would be one that
adjusts other budget items by enough to pay off the increased interest. Since the tax
base in this model is labor income, as a rough approximation near the steady state we
can say that fiscal policy is Ricardian if
XssWssnssτ
d > RssI
g
ss − 1 (74)
(XssWss needs no superscript since it is equalized across sectors in steady state).
At our steady state, (74) requires τ d > 0.00255. On the other hand, optimal
borrowing and lending requires that debt behave approximately as a random walk;
therefore we wish to keep τ d relatively close to zero, implying that shocks to revenues
and expenditure are smoothed out over time by accumulation and decumulation of debt.
Therefore, in order to achieve a high degree of tax smoothing while being entirely sure
that we keep out of the Ricardian regime, we focus on tax rules satisfying τ d = 0.01,
unless specified otherwise.
Our policy analysis will compare the macroeconomic effects of several different fiscal
rules that stabilize the public debt. We compare debt stabilization by adjusting tax
rates with debt stabilization by means of shifts in the value of public sector wages and
transfers, asking how each one affects the volatility of other macroeconomic variables.
22Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2011) analyze interactions across monetary and fiscal policy across
both Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes. While equilibrium may exist in the non-Ricardian “fiscal”
regime, that regime involves a large decrease in welfare, so we wish to avoid it.
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In particular, we start from a benchmark equilibrium characterized by τ d = 0.01,
with all other fiscal parameters set to zero. We then compare alternative rules that
decrease the variability of debt relative to the benchmark equilibrium. All rules leave
steady state variables unchanged, including the steady-state level of public debt, so
our analysis focuses only on the cyclical consequences of each rule.
Now, since a fully credible government would like to pursue a debt policy as close
as possible to a random walk, one might wonder why we are interested in policies that
stabilize debt at all. The reason, of course, is that no government is fully credible, and
that European governments in particular seem to have lost a great deal of credibility
recently, so that many are now asking themselves which fiscal margins should be ad-
justed to reduce the level and standard deviation of their debt. This is the spirit of the
exercises we will perform in this section. If for some reason it becomes necessary to
reduce public debt fluctuations, what are the macroeconomic consequences of various
different policies by which this could be achieved?
5.2 Cyclical effects of different budget stabilization rules
Figure 9 studies the effects of an export demand shock under several different tax rules.
It compares the planner’s economy and the benchmark economy (where τ y = 0) against
four different rules with τ y < 0–that is, rules in which taxes are decreased (increased)
in a boom (recession).23
The shock to export demand stimulates output, so without any adjustment in the
tax rate the tax base would rise and government debt would begin to fall, as we see
in the benchmark case (thick blue line). Thus a rule with τ y < 0 can stabilize debt in
response to a shock of this type, by lowering tax rates as output rises. The figure com-
pares the values τ y ∈ {−0.25,−0.5,−0.75,−1}; in the latter case when nominal GDP
is one percentage point above its trend, the tax rate falls by one percentage point. Such
a large adjustment in tax rates is clearly undesirable as it actually goes beyond debt
stabilization to make debt countercyclical. But a more moderate adjustment, around
τ y = −0.5, (thin red line) serves to keep government debt approximately unchanged
in response to this shock, and helps stabilize total national debt too, as we see in the
third row of the figure.
However, while these rules may help stabilize debt in this context, they destabilize
business cycle fluctuations. By lowering taxes when demand is rising, the rules with
τ y < 0 amplify the fluctuations in nh and ch, pushing them even further away from
23We repeat for clarity: all rules set the coefficient τd = 0.01, unless otherwise stated.
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Figure 9: Effects of export demand shock: Tax rate falls with output.
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the planner’s solution. Indeed, the deviation of ch from the planner’s solution roughly
doubles with τ y = −0.5, though this is partially offset by an increase in the inefficiently
small response of cf .
The obvious destabilizing tendencies of countercyclical tax adjustments as a tool for
budget balance motivate adjustments on the spending side instead. Figure 10 shows
the effects of implementing a rule that adjusts the value of the CSU procyclically,
considering the values ζy ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. Thus the thin magenta line in the figure
shows what happens when public salaries and unemployment benefits are boosted by
one percent when nominal GDP is one percentage point above its trend. This is a
quantitatively weaker budget adjustment than a one-percentage-point change in tax
rates,24 so setting ζy = 1 only removes about half the variation in government debt
24In other words, sinceX is centered around one whereas τ is centered around 0.31 in this simulation,
a one-percentage-point change in the tax rate is a larger proportional change than a one-percentage-
point change in X.
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Figure 10: Effects of export demand shock: Value of CSU rises with output.
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seen in the impulse response function. But in contrast with the effects of the tax rule,
the exchange rate rule pushes nh and ch and both sides of the trade balance moderately
in the direction of the social planning solution as it stabilizes debt.
Intuitively, these CSU rules are stabilizing because they mean that in the event of
an expansion, the fiscal authority will implement an internal revaluation by raising the
wage of public workers (that is, increasing Xt). This potentially introduces volatility
into public sector wages, but brings the dynamics of the model closer to the planner’s
solution while allowing for tax smoothing.
Figures 12-15 (in the appendix) compare the effects of stabilization through the tax
parameter τ y and the public wage parameter ζy in the case of shocks to foreign prices
and interest rates (the diagrams show the same range of values for the parameters that
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we saw in the previous figures). Our previous results are only reinforced by the shock
to P f , which simultaneously destabilizes nh, ch, cf , and cx. The results are somewhat
muddier in the case of the shock to interest rates, where X has nontrivial budget effects
but very little effect on labor and consumption, but our central finding remains true
in this case too. Namely, stabilizing the debt level via the tax parameter τ y further
destabilizes the already-inefficient fluctuations in nh and ch, whereas stabilizing debt
via public wages does not.
Finally, Figs. 16-17 study the case of shocks to government spending. The shape of
the impulse responses is very different in this case, but they still have the property that
eliminating nominal rigidities by shutting down the Calvo frictions brings the responses
of employment and consumption closer to the social planners’ solution. However, the
budgetary implications are reversed with respect to the other demand shocks considered
up to now: an expansion caused by an increase in government spending is likely to
increase rather than decrease the debt. Therefore coefficients τ y < 0 and ζy > 0 are
completely counterproductive from a budgetary perspective in the context of public
spending shocks.
Since government spending shocks are an important source of cyclical fluctuations,
we see that if tax and public wage rules include terms that react to output, they should
include terms that react to public spending as well. Assuming a fiscal multiplier on
the order of magnitude of one, offsetting the counterproductive effects of τ y < 0 and
ζy > 0 requires coefficients τ g and ζg of at least the same absolute magnitude, but of
opposite sign.
Clearly, just looking at shocks one-by-one, and examining individual impulse re-
sponses over a limited time horizon, gives only a partial analysis of the volatility im-
plications of the rules we are considering. Therefore Table 2 reports the standard
deviation of selected variables in the presence of all four shocks, under several alterna-
tive scenarios for the rules.
First, we compare volatilities of consumption, labor, and fiscal and wage variables
under the social planner solution and under the benchmark economy. We then consider
the same volatilities under three fiscal rules that stabilize debt more agressively than the
benchmark economy does. The first rule chooses the tax rule of the form 0 > τ y = −τ g
which minimizes the standard deviation of public debt. The second chooses a CSU rule
of the form 0 < ζy = −ζg that achieves the same standard deviation of public debt
that the tax rule does. Finally, the third is a minimalist tax rule based only on the
level of debt (τ d > 0, with all other rule parameters set to zero) which also achieves
the same standard deviation of public debt as the other two rules do.
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Table 2: Macroeconomic variability as a function of fiscal regime
Standard deviations of key variables under different fiscal regimes
Planner Benchmark τ y = −0.28 ζy = 0.49 τ d = 0.0155
τ g = 0.28 ζg = −0.49
ch 0.0169 0.0290 0.0407 0.0286 0.0324
cf 0.0527 0.0452 0.0447 0.0434 0.0467
cx 0.0687 0.0858 0.0872 0.0822 0.0862
n 0.0107 0.0314 0.0380 0.0305 0.0328
nh 0.0186 0.0397 0.0484 0.0386 0.0416
ng 0.0302 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320
τ 0.0087∗ 0.0167∗ 0.0078∗ 0.0121∗
Dh/PYss 0.2019
∗ 0.2886∗ 0.2155∗ 0.2143∗
Dg/PYss 0.8699
∗ 0.7775∗ 0.7775∗ 0.7775∗
D/PYss 0.1928
∗ 0.9434∗ 0.8814∗ 0.8612∗ 0.8567∗
(1− τ)wh 0.0261 0.0342 0.0254 0.0307
(1− τ)Xwg 0.0261 0.0341 0.0295 0.0307
(1− τ)whnh 0.0501 0.0735 0.0487 0.0567
(1− τ)Xwgng 0.0416 0.0473 0.0441 0.0442
Note: quantities with asterisks are stated in levels. All other variables are expressed in logs.
Simulation assumes economy is driven by shocks cx, pf , g, and r with standard deviations
0.01, 0.01, 0.01, and 0.001 respectively.
Among the class of tax rules considered, the one that minimizes public debt fluc-
tuations is τ y = −0.28 = −τ g. This reduces the standard deviation of debt from 87%
of GDP (the benchmark figure) to 78% of GDP. A CSU rule with ζy = 0.49 = −ζg
implies the same variability of public debt, but implies smaller standard deviations of
all the utility-relevant variables (all components of consumption and labor) than the
tax rule achieves. The difference is especially strong for ch and nh, which are roughly
one-third and one-fourth less volatile under the CSU rule compared with the tax rule.
The CSU rule also reduces the variability of consumption and labor with respect
to the benchmark economy (which in turn has less variability of these variables than
the economy with τ y = −0.28 = −τ g). The volatility ranking across these economies
can be understood in terms of tax smoothing: the benchmark policy smoothes taxes
by bringing the economy closer to a random walk in debt; making taxes contingent
on output and government spending restrains debt variation at the cost of lower tax
smoothing and therefore greater variation in consumption and labor. The CSU rule,
by smoothing the cost of the government’s purchases, achieves a higher degree of tax
smoothing in equilibrium for any given setting of the tax rule parameters.
Motivated by these tax-smoothing considerations, the last column of the table re-
ports another rule that achieves the same reduction in debt volatility as the two rules
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considered previously, by simply raising the coefficient τ d of debt on tax rates. Note
that this coefficient has a much more powerful effect on debt variability than τ y and
τ g: it suffices to raise τ d to 0.0155 to reduce the standard deviation of public debt to
78% of GDP. Thus this rule amplifies ch and nh less than τ y = −0.28 = −τ g does.
However, it still raises volatility of all utility-relevant variables above their benchmark
level, which is in turn more volatile than the equilibrium under the CSU rule.
In the last four rows of the table, we also report after-tax wages and after-tax labor
income for public and private employees. Remarkably, in spite of the fact that the CSU
rule acts directly by varying public sector wages, after-tax wages and after-tax labor
income are actually less variable under the CSU rule than they are under either of the
tax rules that achieve the same level of debt variability. Intuitively, the reduction in
the volatility of the economy as a whole suffices to offset the direct impact of the CSU
rule on public wages. Of the four specifications considered, the only one with lower
volatility of public-sector after-tax wages is the benchmark policy. Thus, public sector
workers might prefer an equilibrium with greater public debt variation. But, under
the parameters considered here, if a reduction in debt volatility becomes inevitable,
rational public sector workers should, in principle, welcome a policy that achieves this
reduction by varying their wages rather than varying tax rates.
The results in Table 2 demonstrate that τ d is a powerful instrument for reduc-
ing debt fluctuations. This is intuitive, since it responds to debt directly, instead of
responding to output and spending. Therefore, Fig. 11 analyzes the effects of debt
stabilization by means of rules with τ d > 0, with all other coefficients set to zero.
The figure compares the benchmark policy (τ d = 0.01) with several alternatives up
to a maximum of τ d = 0.05. With τ d = 0.05 the standard deviation of public debt
falls to roughly 0.4, much lower than the values seen in Table 2. However, the fig-
ure shows that τ d substantially amplifies the fluctuations in home consumption and
private-sector labor, just like the tax rule analyzed previously in Fig. 9. Thus, while τ d
is a better stabilizer for public debt than τ y, both amplify the cycle in a qualitatively
similar way. Regardless of whether tax adjustments respond to the debt level or to
output, achieving some budget stabilization through the CSU exchange rate is likely
to be welfare-improving, given its stabilizing effect on consumption and labor.
6 Conclusions
This paper has studied simple fiscal rules for stabilizing the government debt level
in response to asymmetric demand shocks in a small open economy that forms part
of a currency union. In particular, starting from a baseline fiscal policy with large
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Figure 11: Effects of export demand shock: Taxes rise with debt.
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fluctuations in the public debt, we compare the business cycle effects of several different
rules that reduce the fluctuations in the public debt (the steady state level of public
debt is held fixed across all cases we compare). We consider stabilizing public debt
either by adjustments on the revenue side, or on the expenditure side. We have argued
that an informationally feasible way of adjusting expenditure frequently and flexibly
would be to make across-the-board shifts in public salaries and transfer payments.
Our simulations are based on a DSGE matching model with nominal rigidities, with
business cycles driven by several types of asymmetric demand shocks. We show that
stabilizing public debt by adjusting public salaries and transfers slightly reduces the
fluctuations in consumption and labor, whereas stabilizing public debt by adjusting
taxes strongly amplifies the fluctuations in both variables. Intuitively, this way of
stabilizing debt on the expenditure side amounts to an internal devaluation when the
economy enters into a recession. Thus, this particular expenditure-based mechanism
for stabilizing the government debt keeps the economy closer to the first-best social
planner’s solution than adjusting taxes does. Even after-tax public-sector labor income
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is stabilized by this mechanism, because the reduction in fluctuations of employment
and tax rates is sufficient to offset the direct impact of the rule on public wages.
While this study is a first step towards understanding how policy-making could be
improved in the context of a monetary union, there is a great deal still to be explored. It
would be interesting to explore a wide variety of other fiscal instruments not considered
here, such as consumption taxes, as well as alternative versions of the fiscal rules. More
generally, it would be interesting to find ways of aggregating the model we have used
here beyond a linear approximation, in order to calculate welfare gains and/or study
Ramsey optimal policy.
In the current context, it is possible that sudden progress towards a fiscal union
in Europe will make the issue of sovereign debt seem less urgent. But even if an
agreement on fiscal union is reached soon, countries will have to face the issue of which
fiscal margins to adjust in order to meet their commitments under the new agreement.
Also, countries that wish to maintain as much sovereignty as possible over their own
fiscal decisions may prefer to undertake institutional reforms to guarantee that their
public debts never reach levels that would imply European sanctions. Thus the policy
innovations discussed here may be considered complementary to fiscal union, rather
than mutually exclusive.
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where
wt = bt + χnn
ψn
t c
η0
t + (1− δn)Etβt,t+1s(θt+1)
∫ 1
0
vhL,t+1HhL,t+1 + vgL,t+1HgL,t+1
vt+1
dL, (77)
and
wil,t = φ
i
ta+ Etβt,t+1
[
χvψv
1 + ψv
(zil,t+1)
1+ψvφit+1
]
. (78)
Notice that wt is equal across all producers, since it represents the worker’s outside
option and thus is independent of a worker’s current match, whereas wil,t differs both
across sectors i and producers l.
All producers renegotiating wages at time t in sector i will set the same wage.
Thus, let Hit|t−j denote workers’ time-t surplus in a match that last renegotiated wages
at time t− j. Since adjustment occurs with probability ξw each period, Hit|t−j satisfies
Hit|t−j = (1− τt)
X itW
i∗
t−j
P ct
− wt + (1− δn)Etβt,t+1
(
ξwHit+1|t−j + (1− ξw)Hi∗t+1
)
, (79)
where Hi∗t+1 ≡ Hit+1|t+1 denotes the surplus of a worker in a firm that renegotiates the
wage at time t+ 1. Proceeding in the same way for firms, we have
J it|t−j = wit|t−j −
X itW
i∗
t−j
P ct
+ (1− δn)Etβt,t+1
[
ξwJ it+1|t−j + (1− ξw)J i∗t+1
]
. (80)
Here, wit|t−j is the quantity w
i
l,t defined by (78), evaluated at time t for a firm l which
last renegotiated wages at time t − j and therefore has nominal wage W i∗t−j in its
bargaining currency (or X itW
i∗
t−j in euros). It equals
A Wage dynamics with Calvo stickiness
To solve the model, we need to eliminate all firm-specific variables and write the dy-
namics in terms of aggregate variables only. The only source of firm-specific differences
is wage variation across firms. We assume inflation is zero in steady state. Therefore,
cross-sectional wage differences are driven only by differences in aggregate conditions
at the time of last adjustment; thus cross-sectional variation in wages can be treated
by a first (or nth) order approximation if and only if time variation in macro quantities
can be treated by a first (or nth) order approximation.
The surplus equations for workers and firms, (55) and (57), can be rewritten as
Hil,t = (1− τt)
X itW
i
l,t
P ct
− wt + (1− δn)Etβt,t+1Hil,t+1, (75)
J il,t = wil,t −
X itW
i
l,t
P ct
+ (1− δn)Etβt,t+1J il,t+1, (76)
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and (60) show that ∂H
∂W
is independent of W , whereas ∂J
∂W
varies with W . Therefore we
must also solve for the constant γdJ such that∣∣∣∣∣ ∂̂J il,t∂W
∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣ ̂∂J im,t∂W
∣∣∣∣∣ = γdJ(Wˆ il,t − Wˆ im,t). (84)
Likewise, for the other variables that vary across matches, we must have
zˆil,t − zˆim,t = −γz(Wˆ il,t − Wˆ im,t), (85)
wˆ
i
l,t − wˆ
i
m,t = −γw(Wˆ il,t − Wˆ im,t). (86)
Here, for convenience, we have signed (82)-(86) in a way which will imply that the
unknown constants γH , γJ , γdJ , γz, and γw are all positive.
Next, we solve for γH using the Bellman equation for worker surplus. In particular,
consider a worker employed by a producer l that last adjusted its wage at time t− j.
Log-linearizing (79), and indicating steady states by the subscript ss,
HissHˆit|t−j = (1− τss)
X issW
i
ss
P css
(
Xˆ it + Wˆ
i
t−j − Pˆ ct −
τss
1− τss τˆt
)
− wsswˆit
+(1− δn)βHissEt
(
η0(cˆt − cˆt+1) + ξwHˆit+1|t−j + (1− ξw)Hˆi∗t+1
)
. (87)
Now consider two producers that last adjusted their wages at times t − j and t − k.
Evaluating (87) for each one, and subtracting, we have
wit|t−j = φ
i
ta+
χvψv
1 + ψv
Etβt,t+1φ
i
t+1
[
ξw(z
i
t+1|t−j)
1+ψv + (1− ξw)(zi∗t+1)1+ψv
]
, (81)
where we see that the vacancy-to-lagged-employment ratio zil,t+1 will depend on whether
or not the nominal wage of firm l remains stuck at W i∗t−j.
As we have emphasized, the only idiosyncratic state variable of producer l is its nom-
inal wage W il,t. Hence, in a log-linear approximation (indicated by hats), all produce-
specific endogenous quantities must depend log-linearly on the nominal wage. That is,
for any two producers l and m, worker and producer surpluses must be related by
Hˆil,t − Hˆim,t = γH(Wˆ il,t − Wˆ im,t), (82)
Jˆ il,t − Jˆ im,t = −γJ(Wˆ il,t − Wˆ im,t), (83)
where γH and γJ are unknown constants. To evaluate the Nash bargaining equation,
we will also need the derivatives of surpluses with respect to the wage. Equations (59)
Hiss(Hˆit|t−j−Hˆit|t−k) = (1−γw)wiss(Wˆ it|t−j−Wˆ it|t−k)+(1−δn)βHissξwEt
(
Hˆit+1|t−j − Hˆit+1|t−k
)
,
(88)
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Now consider two producers that last adjusted their wages at times t − j and t − k.
Evaluating (90) for each of these producers, and subtracting, we have
J iss(Jˆ it|t−j − Jˆ it|t−k) = −wiss(Wˆ it|t−j − Wˆ it|t−k) + (1− δn)βJ issξwEt
(
Jˆ it+1|t−j − Jˆ it+1|t−k
)
+βξw
ψv
1 + ψv
zissqssJ issEt
(
(zˆit+1|t−j + Jˆ it+1|t−j − zˆit+1|t−k − Jˆ it+1|t−k)
)
Using Jˆ it|t−j − Jˆ it|t−k = −γJ(Wˆ it|t−j − Wˆ it|t−k) and zˆit|t−j − zˆit|t−k = −γz(Wˆ it|t−j − Wˆ it|t−k),
the minus sign cancels out as we solve for γJ :
J issγJ = wiss + (1− δn)βξwJ issγJ + βξw
ψvz
i
ssqss
1 + ψv
J iss(γz + γJ). (91)
A log-linearization of the zero-profit condition (52) implies γJ = ψvγz, and in steady
state we have zissqss = δn, so this equation simplifies to
γJ = [1− βξw (1− δn(1− ψv))]−1 w
i
ss
J iss
. (92)
The absolute value of the derivative of surplus,
∣∣ ∂J
∂W
∣∣, can be analyzed similarly.
After some tedious algebra, we obtain
γdJ = (1− δn)βξwγdJ + βξwδn(γdJ − γz) = − (1− βξw)−1 βξwδnψvγJ . (93)
where wiss is the steady-state real wage X
i
ssWss/P
c
ss. Note that the log difference
between the wages of two firms that last adjusted at times t− j and t− k is constant
in real terms, so it is equivalent regardless of the future period in which it is evaluated:
Wˆ it|t−j − Wˆ it|t−k = Wˆ it+1|t−j − Wˆ it+1|t−k. Since Hˆit|t−j − Hˆit|t−k = γH(Wˆ it|t−j − Wˆ it|t−k), we
can cancel wages out of the last equation to solve for the unknown constant:
γH =
(1− τss)wiss
(1− (1− δn)βξw)Hiss
(89)
Similarly, consider the surplus J of a producer that last adjusted its wage at time
t− j. Log-linearizing (80),
J issJˆ it|t−j = aφissφˆit|t−j −
X issW
i
ss
P css
(
Xˆ it + Wˆ
i
t−j − Pˆ ct
)
(90)
+(1− δn)βJ issEt
(
η0(cˆt − cˆt+1) + ξwJˆ it+1|t−j + (1− ξw)Jˆ i∗t+1
)
+β
ψv
1 + ψv
zissqssJ issEt
(
η0(cˆt − cˆt+1) + qˆt+1 + ξw(zˆit+1|t−j + Jˆ it+1|t−j) + (1− ξw)(zˆi∗t+1 + Jˆ i∗t+1)
)
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This equation can be simplified further by log-linearizing the average wage dynamics
(53) of sector i. Bearing in mind that in steady state, the average nominal wage equals
the nominal reset wage, (W iss = W
i∗
ss ), the log-linearized average wage dynamics are
Wˆ it = ξwWˆ
i
t−1 + (1− ξw)Wˆ i∗t . (96)
Rearranging, (96) becomes
(1− ξw)(Wˆ i∗t − Wˆ it ) = ξw(Wˆ it − Wˆ it−1) (97)
Thus the log deviation between the reset wage and the sectoral average wage is pro-
portional to sectoral wage inflation, Wˆ it − Wˆ it−1. Note that (97) can be cancelled out
of (95), leaving a Bellman equation in terms of cross-sectional averages only:
HissHˆit = (1−τss)
X issW
i
ss
P css
(
Xˆ it + Wˆ
i
t − Pˆ ct −
τss
1− τss τˆt
)
−wsswˆit+(1−δn)βHissEt
(
η0(cˆt − cˆt+1) + Hˆit+1
)
.
Likewise, the firm’s surplus can be rewritten in terms of cross-sectional averages by
using (97) to eliminate the terms relating to wage dispersion:
J issJˆ it = aφissφˆit −
X issW
i
ss
P css
(
Xˆ it + Wˆ
i
t − Pˆ ct
)
+ (1− δn)βJ issEt
(
η0(cˆt − cˆt+1) + Jˆ it+1
)
+β
ψv
1 + ψv
zissqssJ issEt
(
η0(cˆt − cˆt+1) + qˆt+1 + zˆit+1 + Jˆ it+1
)
.
We can now write all the surplus equations in terms of cross-sectional averages,
such as the average worker surplus Hˆit. We can find a recursive equation for Hˆit by
calculating the cross-sectional average at time t+1 for employees whose wages are not
renegotiated at time t+ 1. This average is
Hˆit+1 + γH(Wˆ it − Wˆ it+1), (94)
since the log-linear solution for Hˆ must be corrected for the change in the average
wage, Wˆ it+1 − Wˆ it . Rewriting (87) in terms of cross-sectional averages, we have
HissHˆit = (1− τss)
X issW
i
ss
P css
(
Xˆ it + Wˆ
i
t − Pˆ ct −
τss
1− τss τˆt
)
− wsswˆit
+(1−δn)βHissEt
[
η0(cˆt − cˆt+1) + Hˆit+1 + γH
(
ξw(Wˆ
i
t − Wˆ it+1) + (1− ξw)(Wˆ i∗t+1 − Wˆ it+1)
)]
.
(95)
HissHˆit = (1−τss)
X issW
i
ss
P css
(
Xˆ it + ˆ
i
t
ˆc
t −
τss
1− τss τˆt
)
−wss ˆ it+(1−δn)βHissEt
(
η0(cˆt − cˆt+1) + Hˆit+1
)
.
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Similarly, for the derivative of the producer’s surplus, we obtain∣∣∣∣∂J i∂W
∣∣∣∣
ss
̂∣∣∣∣∂J it∂W
∣∣∣∣ = X issP css
(
Xˆ it − Pˆ ct
)
+ (1− δn)β
̂∣∣∣∣∂J it∂W
∣∣∣∣Et
(
η0(cˆt − cˆt+1) +
̂∣∣∣∣∂J it+1∂W
∣∣∣∣
)
+βzissqss
∣∣∣∣∂J i∂W
∣∣∣∣
ss
Et
(
η0(cˆt − cˆt+1) + qˆt+1 + zˆit+1 +
̂∣∣∣∣∂J it+1∂W
∣∣∣∣
)
.
We can now use these log-linearized surplus equations to state the Nash bargaining
equation in terms of cross-sectional averages. The equation
σJ i∗t
∂Hi∗t
∂W i∗t
= (1− σ)Hi∗t
∣∣∣∣ ∂J i∗t∂W i∗t
∣∣∣∣ (98)
can be rewritten as
Jˆ it − γJ(Wˆ i∗t − Wˆ it ) +
∂̂Hi∗t
∂W i∗t
= Hˆit + γH(Wˆ i∗t − Wˆ it ) +
̂∣∣∣∣ ∂J it∂W it
∣∣∣∣+ γdJ(Wˆ i∗t − Wˆ it ). (99)
This equation suffices to determine the reset wage W i∗t .
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Comparative dynamics: shock to pf, xmulty>0. Dark blue dash=CSU constant; Thick blue line=BENCHMARK.
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Figure 13: Effects of foreign price shock: Tax rate falls with output.
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Comparative dynamics: shock to pf. Dark blue dash=PLANNER. Thick blue line=BENCHMARK.
0 20 40
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
to
ta
l d
eb
t
Figure 12: Effects of foreign price shock: Value of CSU rises with output.
Comparative dynamics: shock to pf. Dark blue dash=PLA NER. Thick blue line=BENCHMARK.
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Figure 14: Effects of interest rate shock: Value of CSU rises with output.
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Figure 15: Effects of interest rate shock: Tax rate falls with output.
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Comparative dynamics: shock to r. Dark blue dash=PLANNER. Thick blue line=BENCHMARK.
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Comparative dynamics: shock to r, xmulty>0. Dark blue dash=CSU constant; Thick blue line=BENCHMARK.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 53 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1207
Figure 16: Effects of government spending shock: Value of CSU rises with output.
Comparative dynamics: shock to g, xmulty>0. Dark blue dash=CSU constant; Thick blue line=BENCHMARK.
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Figure 17: Effects of government spending shock: Tax rate falls with output.
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Comparative dynamics: shock to g. Dark blue dash=PLANNER. Thick blue line=BENCHMARK.
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